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1. Introduction
 
The question of firm’s choice of financing securities, particularly the equity issue remains 
one of the most intensely argued and enigmatic debate in corporate finance. An answer to 
this apparently straightforward question has its root in the seminal paper by Modigliani 
and Miller (1958 and 1963) in which the authors had demonstrated that in a typical neo-
classical market firms enjoy the benefit of a complete separation of their investment and 
financing decisions. However, over the last couple of decades, by bringing in the 
concepts of asymmetry of information and agency costs, the theory of capital structure 
choice has significantly evolved. One of the widely cited asymmetric information models 
developed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) predicts that the information 
asymmetry between the insiders and outsiders of the firm creates a pecking order over the 
choice of financing sources.  
Based on the argument posited by Myers, the information asymmetry between managers 
and potential shareholders drives this pecking order in which the firm begins with 
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internal funds, followed by debt and then move to equity in order to finance their 
investment in an effort to minimize adverse selection possibilities. One of the main 
implications of this theory is that firms will have to under price their equity offerings in 
order to induce investors to subscribe to them. This raises the cost of equity funds to 
firms and hence they are reluctant to raise funds through these sources.  In other words, a 
firm with superior information about their internal assets with respect to the market 
displays at first a preference for retained earnings followed by respectively safe debts, 
risky debts and finally for equity under duress. 
 A growing body of literature has emerged over couple of decades which has attempted to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the pecking order model as an accurate description of 
observed financing behaviour. However, the skepticism about the pecking order model 
and difference in conclusions dominate this arena of work. For example, in the recent 
studies, while the paper of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) conclude that the pecking 
order offers a good description of observed financing behaviour of the US firms, the 
papers of Fama and French (2002,2005) and Frank and Goyal (2003) conclude the 
opposite. Further, though both the latter studies refute the conclusion of   Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers, they differ in their own conclusion as well. In contrast to Fama and French 
(2005), Frank and Goyal (2003) infer that the pecking order is a better descriptor of the 
financing behaviour of the small firms as opposed to the large firms. Lemmon and 
Zender (2004) test the pecking order model taking into consideration the financial 
distress cost and conclude that the model indeed aptly captures the financial pattern of 
firms. Fama and French (2005), however, disagree with this conclusion. Leary and 
Roberts (2004) also proceed in the similar vein as Lemmon and Zender (2004) and 
include financial distress cost in their analysis but do not conclude in favour of the 
pecking order model. Using a novel information asymmetry index based on the market 
micro structure literature, Bharath et al (2006) test if information asymmetry is an 
important determinant of capital structure decision. They argue that firms characterized 
by low information asymmetry account for the majority of the pecking order failure. 
Therefore, even after decades of research attempting to test the efficacy of the pecking 
order theory to describe the capital structure decisions, the empirical evidence in favour 
of the theory remains still mixed at best.  
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Further, the existing empirical research has been largely confined to the US and a few 
other developed countries that may have institutional similarities. The issue of the capital 
structure choice in the developing countries has, however, received little attention. Only 
in recent years, a few studies have attempted to shed light on the capital structure choice 
within the institutional specifics of developing countries using firm specific information 
(Bhaduri (1999) Booth et al. (2001), Cobham and Subramaniam (1998), Cherian (1996), 
Singh (1995)). Moreover, a review of the literature reveals that there is no consensus or a 
definitive support of the pecking order as an accurate description of observed financial 
behaviour. 
In a pioneering study, Singh and Hameed (1992) using a cross country analysis show that 
external sources in general and equity in particular are much more important in 
developing countries than in their developed counterparts.  These results are startling 
because of two reasons. First, they stand in contrast to Mayer’s (1988,1990) findings that 
the firms in developed countries depend more on the internal sources of finance and have 
minimal dependence on equity sources of finance.In fact, Singh and Hameed (1992) 
suggest the possibility of “reverse pecking order” for the developing countries. It also, 
indicates the possibility that large firms in developing countries might be different from 
those in the advanced countries in many important respects. Hence, it requires a 
systematic examination of corporate financing patterns and capital structure choices for 
firms in developing countries. Second, the result that the firms in developing world rely 
more on external sources stands quite contrary to the a priori expectations. Given the low 
levels of development of the stock market and the imperfections there in, one would 
expect firms in developing countries to depend more on internal sources of finance. This 
encouraged critics of Singh and Hameed (1992) to undertake more country specific 
studies with larger data set. Their objections to the Singh and Hameed study were two 
fold: First, the data set used for the Singh and Hameed study constitutes only top 50 (in 
Singh (1995) it is top 100) companies which might not be a true representation of their 
corporate sector. The second reason, which is more substantive in nature, came from 
Samuel (1996). He pointed out that the Singh and Hameed’s finding of a reverse pecking 
order is essentially driven by the very definition of internal sources of finance used. The 
definition of the internal sources of funds used in Singh and Hameed study excludes 
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depreciation1 as an internal source of finance. As a result it undermines the role of 
internal sources of finance. Recent studies on the India corporate sector by Bhaduri 
(1999) Cobham and Subramaniam (1998), Cherian (1996), provide results that are at 
odds with Singh and Hameed’s result.  All these studies use a much larger set of 
companies than that used by Singh and Hameed and the focus has been exclusively on 
India. Therefore, the existing literature on capital structure choice in the context of 
developing economy has been vexing and, to a large extent, an unresolved issue.                            
  The goal of this paper is to provide a deeper insight into the issue by studying the 
extent to which the pecking order theory of capital structure provides a satisfactory 
description of financing behaviour of the Indian firms over the years 1997 to 2007. Apart 
from expanding the time series the contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, the paper 
provides evidence about the broad pattern of financial activities in India using a sample 
of 556 firms that had maintained its existence over the period 1997-2007.  This stands in 
contrast to most of the studies based on Indian data, barring a few (e.g Bhaduri (1999)), 
which tend to portray mainly a macro picture without adequately controlling the possible 
sources of differentiation between firms in their optimization choices. Second, the paper 
develops a direct test of pecking order hypothesis which enables us to identify the extent 
to which the pecking order behaviour is consistent with the observed financing decision. 
In other words, the paper precisely focuses on exactly, where and when the pecking order 
hypothesis succeeds or fails to conform to the observed financing behaviour. In doing so, 
we are able to identify the situations where the theory struggles to conform to the data, 
thereby revealing elements that are missing from the theory.          
Barring a few (e.g Bharath et al. (2006)) most of the studies on the pecking order relies 
on the financing-deficit regression proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) who, 
developed a key testable prediction of pecking order by suggesting that financing deficit 
should exactly be matched by a change in leverage. Exception to this rule is observed 
only under duress. Hence, the regression of net debt issue on financing deficit along with 
a null hypothesis of slope coefficient being one has emerged as the main working 
hypothesis to test the pecking order theory. In contrast, our paper attempts to deploy a 
                                                 
1 Singh and Hamid (1992) ignore depreciation as internal sources of finance because of non-availability of 
depreciation data for many sample countries. 
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direct test of the pecking order hypothesis to address the concerns raised by Chirinko and 
Singha (2000). We first investigate how well the pecking order describes the financing 
decisions by testing the likelihood of an exact proportional relationship between net debt 
issue and financing deficit where the assumptions regarding the asymmetry of 
information and the riskiness of the firm are most likely to be met.  This approach, as 
pointed out by Leary and Roberts (2004) is consistent with the approach of “simply 
staking up cards in favour of the pecking order hypothesis and determining an upper 
bound to its explanatory power”. In addition, the approach also helps us identify 
situations where the pecking order struggles to describe financial behaviour and thereby 
enable us to suggest a possible integration of alternative theories in explaining the 
observed behaviour. Thus, this approach consistent with Leary and Roberts (2004) helps 
to shed light on the quality of the pecking order as a “conditional theory”.    
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology. 
Section 3 provides the description of the data used in this study. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results and the final section concludes the paper.  
   
 
2. Methodology 
Any complete test of the pecking order should focus on its main prediction concerning 
the type of securities that firms issue to cover its financial deficit. In a world of 
asymmetric information all the risky securities are mispriced, since the insiders of the 
firm do not have any credible method of conveying information regarding the quality of 
the assets and the prospects they have. As a result, investors ask for “premium” in order 
to compensate for the probability of investing in bad firms. Firms always try to minimize 
such adverse selection premium by utilizing retained earning and thereafter issuing the 
safest security such as debt, as these are least affected by the information problem. 
Hence, the safest firm would therefore issue a public debt, while firms with moderate risk 
will issue private debt which suffers relatively less from the information problem due to 
covenants and monitoring.  Finally the most risky firm would resort to equity.  
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This observation is further developed into a key testable prediction in the form of 
financing deficit regression initially proposed by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and 
further used by many studies by Frank and Goyal (2003) and Lemmon and Zender 
(2004).  Specifically the empirical model used in these studies is given as: 
)1(ititit DEFD εβα ++=∆  
 
where DEFit follows the standard account flow of fund identity given as: 
  
)2(ititititititit EDCWIDIVDEF ∆+∆=−∆++=  
where DIV is cash dividends, I is net investment, ∆W is change in working capital, C is 
cash flow after interest and taxes, while ∆D and ∆E are the net debt and net equity issued 
in a particular year respectively.   
In the equation (1) the pecking order hypothesis implies that α=0 and β=1, thus 
suggesting an exact proportional match of financing deficit by a change in debt. In 
contrast, we do not test the predictive power of this specification in order to describe the 
observed financing behaviour in conformity with the pecking order hypothesis. Instead, 
we develop an empirical model to test when and where the likelihood of this proportional 
relationship between deficit and debt do not conform to an exact relationship as predicted 
by the pecking order. In other words, we seek to identify the non-conformity with the 
pecking order hypothesis, in contrast to many recent studies.2  
 
In the empirical model we propose to capture the likelihood of an event of non-
conformity with the pecking order hypothesis using a logistic regression equation. The 
dependent variable of the logistic model defines a dichotomous outcome based on the 
exact relationship between deficit and debt. In other words, the dependent variables take 
the value one in an event of non-conformity with the pecking order, i.e.  (∆Dit/DEF it) is 
not equal to one indicting an equity issue. Specifically the model is:  
)3()
1
log( βαπ
π X+=−  
                                                 
2 For example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Frank and Goyal (2003), Fama and French (2005), 
Lemmon and Zender (2004) and Bharath et al (2006). 
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where, π denotes the probability of non-conformity with the pecking order theory and β is 
the vector of coefficients. This framework also helps us to convert the log of odds back to 
the probability as:  
)4(
)1( )(
)(
βα
βα
π x
x
e
e
+
+
+=  
 
However, in this framework any non-conformity does not necessarily mean a violation of 
the pecking order hypothesis to describe the observed financing behaviour. The pecking 
order does not necessarily hypothesize that firms should never issue or repurchase equity. 
In contrast, it suggests that firms issue equity only under duress. For example, a firm 
could be in duress if it faces a high deficit and cannot issue fresh debt as it is already 
highly levered. Therefore, in this model we attempt to identify events when and why the 
pecking order succeeds or fails to conform to the observed financing behaviour. The 
pecking order theory is based on the asymmetry of information between insiders and the 
market. Accordingly, it is natural to examine how the likelihood of non-conformity with 
the pecking order increases with the degree of asymmetry of information faced by the 
firm. To this end a set of explanatory variables is introduced in the model which 
significantly influence the degree of information asymmetry, riskiness and debt capacity 
faced by the firm.  
In contrast to the existing approach (Leary and Roberts (2004), Frank and Goyal (2003) 
and Fama and French (2005)) which predominantly uses a sub-sample analysis to test this 
hypothesis, we use a multivariate approach using a logistic regression framework. The 
multivariate approach helps us to understand the marginal impact of each of these factors 
in influencing the non-conformity with the pecking order hypothesis. Since this approach 
only focuses on identifying events where the pecking order theory does not provide an 
accurate description of the data, it does not offer any explicit evidence in favour of the 
financial hierarchy as proposed by the pecking order theory.   
 
Turning to our empirical model, we introduce the level of deficit as an explanatory 
variable as we tend to believe that beyond certain threshold of deficit to asset ratio, firms 
may be forced to issue equity. Next, in order to distinguish the effect of a surplus firm 
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from that of deficit one, we split the sample into groups depending on their deficit values: 
a cash rich group, is characterized by negative deficit values, a medium group with 
positive but small deficit to asset ratio and a cash poor characterized by high deficit to 
asset ratio. The precise separation between a medium and a high group is identified 
through a sample split algorithm proposed by Hansen (1999).  Also we anticipate that the 
threshold effect of deficit might get even more accentuated in the case of low debt 
capacity firms. This conjecture is also consistent with the view of Myers and Majluf 
(1984) that in the face of financial distress, firms confront constraints to issue debt and 
are forced to issue equity. To capture this effect, we have introduced interaction dummies 
based on deficit and debt capacity faced by the firm. 
     Second, we have introduced both direct and indirect measures of debt capacity ( such 
as lagged long term debt to asset ratio as the direct and size and age as the indirect 
measures). This is consistent with the view of Leary and Robert (2004) that for larger, 
older and more capital intensive firms the debt capacity is less likely to be a concern. As 
mentioned earlier, the debt capacity is further interacted with the deficit levels to examine 
to what extent the firms with a high deficit coupled with a limited debt capacity constitute 
the group whose equity issuance violate the pecking order model.  
Finally, we have noted that the pecking order claims that the type of security choice 
would be decided by the riskiness and the degree of asymmetric information faced by the 
firm (Helwege and Liang (1996)). Therefore, a set of proxies to capture riskiness and 
asymmetry premium are introduced into the model.          
In order to control for the riskiness of the firm we introduce following variables: past 
leverage (one period lagged long term debt to asset ratio), volatility of cash flow 
(standard deviation of past three years cash flow) and liquidity ratio (ratio of current asset 
to current liability), while tangible assets (ratio of net fixed assets to total assets) lag 
divided payment (dummy which takes value one if dividend is paid last year), age (log of 
age), size (log of total assets), growth ( growth of total assets) and assets specificity (ratio 
of R&D to total assets) are introduced to control for the asymmetry of the information 
faced by the firm. The lower the liquidity ratio and higher the cash flow volatility and 
past leverage, the more the firms are vulnerable to financial distress and hence tend to 
avoid debt. Similarly small, young and high growth firms are subject to more adverse 
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selection problems and hence tend to conform more to the theory. It is often argued that 
size and age capture reputation effect and hence larger and older firm might face less 
asymmetric information. However, it is important to note that these proxies for 
information asymmetry might have conflicting interpretation. For example, size and age 
are also likely to be positively correlated with debt capacity and tend to be positively 
associated with leverage.  Similarly, the tangibility might play a conflicting role in capital 
structure decision.  While the conventional view suggests that the tangible assets provide 
the collateral and hence it is associated with increasing leverage. Harris and Raviv (1991) 
pointed out that tangibility could also be a credible signal to resolve asymmetric 
information problem and hence firms with higher tangible assets are likely to issue 
equity. On a similar count, firms paying dividends and firms with moderate leverage are 
likely to have less severe adverse selection problems and hence may not adhere to the 
pecking order theory.   
We have also introduced two additional variables, profitability (ratio of net profit to total 
assets) and financial slack (ratio of cash and investments to total assets. Firms with high 
profitability and high financial slack are commonly thought to be less leveraged (Fama 
and French (2002)). However, as pointed out by Frank and Goyal (2003), these proxies 
are open to multiple interpretations. First, current profitability can also act as a signal of 
investment opportunities. Alternatively, in the face of adjustment cost, profitable firms 
will be less levered even if the tradeoff theory is valid. We have also considered the 
timing of non-conformity as many studies such as Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald 
(1990, 1991) Coe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) have 
pointed out the influence of timing varying adverse selection problem on security issue. 
Therefore, following Leary and Roberts (2004) we split our sample period into high 
equity (hot) year and neutral year. “Hot” periods are defined as those in the upper quartile 
of the distribution of number of equity issuance in that year scaled by the number of firms 
in the sample. For our sample 1997, 2005 and 2006 turned out to be “hot” years. Finally, 
in order to control for unobservable firm specific effects both industry (42 industry 
dummies) and year fixed effect are introduced in the model.    
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3. Data and Sample: 
 
The study uses data drawn from an electronic database called “Capitaline Plus” which 
provides a comprehensive record of accounting and financial information of the Indian 
firms. Since the focus of this study is on manufacturing establishments, attention here is 
restricted to a smaller subset of firms listed in this database. From this data set we 
selected firms based on the criterion that the firms should have maintained its identity and 
reported its annual accounts without any gap for the financial years 1997 to 2007. 
Screening for data consistency on the basis of this criterion led us to select sample of 585 
firms, belonging to a divergent spectrum of 8 broad industries, viz., food, textiles, 
chemicals, metals and metal products, non-metallic mineral products, machinery and 
transport3. The final sample consists of a balanced panel of 585 non-financial firms for 11 
years giving 6435 firm-year observations with no missing data. Therefore, the sample set, 
being a composite and heterogeneous mix of firms, offers considerable scope for cross 
sectional variation in data. In addition to the fact that the firms under consideration come 
from a broad spectrum of industries, this heterogeneity of the sample makes itself 
apparent in the spread of distribution of the firms over age and size.  
 
 
4. Empirical Results:  
 
In order to understand the pattern of security issue in India we have analyzed several 
indicators and traced the pattern across time as well as various other firm specific 
attributes. We begin with a simplest definition of equity issue as an event of net equity 
being positive while debt issue is captured as net debt being positive. Table 1 provides 
the average incidence of debt and equity issue of our sample from 1997-2007. The 
overall average of equity issue in India is a moderate 17%.While on an average more than 
54% of our sample depends on debt issue.  However, we do see a sudden spurt in equity 
issues in 1997, 2006, and 2007.  
 
                                                 
3 At a lower level the data belongs to 42 industries 
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Table 1: Pattern of security issue over 1997-2007. 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period 
is 1997 to 2007. An equity issue is an event of net equity being positive while debt issue is captured as net 
debt being positive. 
 
Year Equity Issue Debt Issue 
1997 24.3% 62.8%
1998 20.5% 61.0%
1999 16.5% 57.2%
2000 16.2% 57.5%
2001 12.9% 53.6%
2002 11.1% 45.3%
2003 9.8% 45.6%
2004 14.2% 44.3%
2005 16.5% 54.4%
2006 21.8% 52.6%
2007 24.3% 56.5%
Over all 17.1% 53.7%
 
 
Since our current definition of equity issue ignores the other contemporaneous security 
issues and their usages, we further refine our definition into pure equity, pure debt and a 
joint issue decision. We define a pure equity decision as an event where net equity is 
positive while the change in debt is zero or negative4. Therefore, a pure equity issue 
would suggest an event of a sole equity issue or an issue to reduce outstanding debt and 
hence provide a better indicator of a security preference of a firm. Similarly, the pure 
debt decision would involve a sole debt issue as the equity repurchase is absent in our 
sample.          
Finally a joint issue would involve both debt and equity issue. Table 2 provides the trend 
of security issues over our sample period of 1997-2007. On average, the incident of pure 
equity issue in India is as little as 7% while the debt issue remains the major source of 
funding. It is also important to note that in 10% cases firms decide to issue both types of 
securities. On the other hand, in 40% cases firms depend on internal sources of funds.            
                                                 
4 Since no repurchase of equity is observed in the sample the net equity for this study implies a gross equity 
issue.   
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 The information reported in Table 1 and 2 illustrate an important fact about the financial 
structures of the Indian firms. According to Fama and French (2005), during 1993-2003, 72% 
of the American firms issued equity. Table 1and 2 clearly demonstrate that this is not the 
pattern observed in India as during the similar time frame (1997-2008) only 17% of Indian 
firms  issued equity. 
 
Table 2: Pattern of security issue over 1997-2007. 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period 
is 1997 to 2007.A pure equity issue indicates an event of a sole equity issue or an issue to reduce 
outstanding debt. A pure debt decision indicate a sole debt issue as the equity re purchase is absent in our 
sample. A joint issue would involve both debt and equity issue. 
 
 Year Pure Equity Pure Debt Joint Issue None 
1997 0.08 0.46 0.17 0.30 
1998 0.07 0.47 0.14 0.32 
1999 0.06 0.47 0.10 0.36 
2000 0.06 0.47 0.10 0.36 
2001 0.05 0.46 0.07 0.41 
2002 0.06 0.40 0.05 0.49 
2003 0.06 0.41 0.04 0.49 
2004 0.08 0.39 0.06 0.47 
2005 0.07 0.45 0.09 0.38 
2006 0.09 0.40 0.13 0.38 
2007 0.08 0.40 0.16 0.35 
Over all 0.07 0.44 0.10 0.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Pattern of security issue over 1997-2007. 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period 
is 1997 to 2007. Positive deficit indicate firms with DEF greater than zero as defined in equation (2). 
Surplus indicates a firm with a negative DEF. 
 Over all Positive Deficit Surplus 
Pure Equity 7.02% 3.08% 12.60% 
Pure Debt 43.62% 74.42%  
Joint issue  10.08% 17.20%  
None 39.28% 5.31% 87.40% 
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 Table 3 provides the distribution of security issue across positive deficit and surplus 
firms.  In contrast to the pecking order theory, predominantly the surplus firms in the 
sample indulge into equity issues, while 75% of deficit firms depend on pure debt issues.  
Only a meager 3% positive deficit firms issues pure equity, whereas around 17% positive 
deficit firms prefer a joint issue. Notably, majority of the surplus firms (88%) remains 
dormant and do not issue any securities.  
Table 4 provides further break down into security preference of our sample. In contrast to 
deficit firms, most of the surplus firms either retire outstanding debts (87.33%) or issue 
equity along with a reduction in their outstanding debt (12.60%).  Only less than 1% 
cases deficit firms issue equity and 2.69% cases they combine this with a reduction in 
their outstanding debts. 
 
Table 4: Pattern of security issue over 1997-2007. 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period 
is 1997 to 2007. Positive deficit indicate firms with DEF greater than zero as defined in equation (2). 
Surplus indicates a firm with a negative DEF.  
 
Issue Events All  Positive Deficit Surplus 
Retire Debt (net debt negative) 36.14%  87.33%
Debt Issue (net debt positive) 43.62% 74.42%  
Equity Repurchase (net equity negative) 0% 0% 0% 
Equity Issue (net equity positive) 0.23% 0.38%  
Both net debt and equity negative    
Both net debt and equity positive 10.08% 17.20%  
Net debt positive and equity negative    
Net debt negative and equity positive 6.79% 2.69% 12.60%
none ( Deficit= 0) 3.14% 5.31% 0.07%
 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
 
Therefore, in sum, we observe a trend which is consistent with the pecking order 
hypothesis. Most importantly these results are also inconsistent with many theoretical 
papers put forth by Cooney and Kalay (1993), Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), Halov and 
Heider (2004) Bolton and Dewatript (2005) and Hennnessy and Livdan (2006).          
 
 
A similar picture also emerges from the year-on-year aggregate fund flow statement 
presented in Table 5 and 6. Three main conclusions can be drawn from these tables: First, 
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equity plays only a marginal role as a source of fund for the Indian firms. Second, though 
these firms avoid equity issuance, their dependence on external finance is more than on 
internal finance. However, the dependence has shown a decline over the sample period. 
Most importantly, the bulk of the external finance constitutes corporate borrowings. 
Finally, while majority of the surplus firms reduce debt they also issue equity. Therefore, 
empirically we observed a mixed evidence for the pecking order theory.  It is worth 
noting that these results stand in stark contrast to many studies for the developed 
countries such as (Fama and French (2005), Frank and Goyal (2003), Leary and Roberts 
(2004)). Specifically, according to Frank and Goyal (2003), US firms tend to depend 
more on the equity finance as opposed to debt and during their sample period net equity 
issues had grown at a faster rate than net debt issue. Therefore, what Table 5 and 6 show 
is exactly reverse of the conclusions inferred by Frank and Goyal (2003).  
16
  
Table 5: Trends in flow of funds for positive deficit firms: 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period is 1997 to 2007. All the numbers are scaled by total 
source of funds.  We report the average ratio of the annual aggregate value of the numerator for a portfolio divided by the aggregate value of assets, in percent. 
 
Table 6: Trends in flow of funds for surplus firms.   
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period is 1997 to 2007. All the numbers are scaled by total 
source of funds.  We report the average ratio of the annual aggregate value of the numerator for a portfolio divided by the aggregate value of assets, in percent. 
 
   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 20042003 2005 2006 2007 Over all
Dividend 0.334 0.149 0.328 0.506 0.261 0.319 0.314 0.382 0.347 0.228 0.182 0.279
Investments 0.562 0.851 0.542 0.338 0.612 0.649 0.611 0.413 0.563 0.582 0.584 0.581
Change in Working Capital  0.098 -0.249 -0.070 -1.548 -0.220 -0.864 
  
 
-0.403 -0.131 0.191 0.253 0.100 -0.131
Cash Flow 1.607 1.173 1.514 1.828 1.277 0.746 1.365 1.993 2.021 1.623 1.186 1.463
Deficit -0.613 -0.422 -0.714 -2.531 -0.623 -0.642 -0.843 -1.329 -0.920 -0.559 -0.319 -0.734
Net Debt -0.660 -0.434 -0.725 -2.553 -0.638 -0.653 -0.851 -1.363 -0.941 -0.578 -0.329 -0.750
Net Equity  0.047 0.012 0.010 0.022 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.034 0.021 0.019 0.010 0.017
External Finance  -0.613 -0.422 -0.714 -2.531 -0.623 -0.642 -0.843 -1.329 -0.920 -0.559 -0.319 -0.734
Internal Finance 1.613 1.422 1.714 3.531 1.623 1.642 1.843 2.329 1.920 1.559 1.319 1.734
Total Source of Finance 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
1997 19991998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 20062005 2007 Over all
Dividend 0.112  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
0.092 0.112 0.133 0.186 0.081 0.184 0.114 0.192 0.129 0.097 0.121
Investments 0.968 0.847 0.850 0.937 0.919 0.931 0.876 0.834 0.769 0.854 0.897 0.878
Change in Working Capital  0.259 0.282 0.180 0.283 0.381 0.129 0.137 0.055 0.605 0.288 0.218 0.246
Cash Flow 0.615 0.491 0.457 0.735 0.769 0.600 0.604 0.675 0.964 0.800 0.716 0.695
Deficit 0.724 0.6860.731 0.618 0.718 0.541 0.592 0.328 0.602 0.472 0.496 0.550
Net Debt 0.710 0.701 0.649 0.583 0.669 0.534 0.524 0.319 0.581 0.459 0.484 0.529
Net Equity  0.014 0.030 0.036 0.036 0.048 0.007 0.068 0.009 0.021 0.013 0.012 0.020
External Finance  0.724 0.731 0.686 0.618 0.718 0.541 0.592 0.328 0.602 0.472 0.496 0.550
Internal Finance 0.276 0.269 0.314 0.382 0.282 0.459 0.408 0.672 0.398 0.528 0.504 0.450
Total Source of Finance 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
 
 
         
Therefore, though the majority of the Indian firms predominantly select debt as preferred 
mode of funding, there exists a small segment of firms which issue equity. And one of the 
primary objectives of this paper is to explore this segment and understand why and under 
what circumstance they issue equity.  We begin our analysis by analyzing the difference in 
average characteristics of debt issuing and equity issuing firms. Table 7A provides these 
average characteristics along with the statistical significance of these differences.  
 
Table 7A: Average attribute of security issuing firms: 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period is 
1997 to 2007. For column 4, “*” indicates a statistical difference in mean at 1% level of significance, while 
“**” indicates a 5% level of significance. 
Attributes 
Debt 
Issue (b) 
Equity 
Issue (c) 
Difference  
(Col (b) – Col(c) 
Deficit to Assets Ratio 0.12 0.05 0.07* 
Surplus to Assets Ratio   0.00 -0.03 0.03* 
Positive Deficit to Assets Ratio 0.12 0.09 0.03* 
Total Assets 610.93 1391.64 -780.71* 
Age 32.66 33.94 -1.28** 
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 0.21 0.18 0.03* 
Lag Dividend Payment Dummy 0.68 0.74 -0.06* 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.07 0.07 0.00 
Liquidity 2.90 2.87 0.03 
RND to  Assets Ratio 0.0012238 0.0019523 -0.0007285* 
Growth Rate of Assets 18.19 23.37 -5.18* 
Tangible Assets  0.91 0.51 0.40 
Net Profit to Assets Ratio 0.01 0.07 -0.05* 
Financial Slack 0.13 0.16 -0.03* 
Hot Year Dummy 0.29 0.37 -0.08* 
Pure Equity Incidence 0.00 0.41 -0.41* 
Pure Debt Incidence 0.81 0.00 0.81* 
Combined Equity and Debt Issue 0.19 0.59 -0.40* 
 
 
Table 7A reveals that debt issuing firms are high deficits, low growth, less profitable firms and 
with less assets specificity. In contrast, equity issuing firms are low deficit, large, matured, and 
more profitable and cash rich. We also observe that the debt issuing firms tend to have more 
tangible assets and liquidity. However, in contrast to the general expectation debt issuing firms 
are more leveraged. Table 7A also brings out two interesting facts about equity issuing firms: 
First, firms with dividend history prefer equity issue and it also observed that firms tend to time 
their equity issue in “hot years”. Second, firms with surpluses issue equity. Therefore, though the 
first observation is consistent with the pecking order, second one is not. Finally, 59% of equity 
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issuing firms tend to issue equity along with a debt issue, while only 19% of debt issuer combine 
it with an equity issue. Also 81% of debt issue is a “pure debt issue” while only 41% of equity 
issue is a “pure equity” issue.  
 
Table 7B: Average attribute of security issuing firms: 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period is 1997 to 
2007.  For column 6, 7 and 8 “*” indicates a statistical difference in mean at 1% level of significance, while “**” 
indicates a 5% level of significance. 
 Pure 
Equity 
(a) 
Pure 
Debt 
(b) 
Combined 
Debt and 
Equity 
(c) 
None 
(d) 
 
 
(b)-(a) 
 
 
(c)-(a) 
 
 
(d)-(a) 
Deficit to Assets Ratio -0.065 0.115 0.136 -0.171 0.180* 0.201* -0.106*
Surplus to Assets Ratio   -0.080 0.000 0.000 -0.171 0.080* 0.080* -0.091*
Positive Deficit to Assets Ratio 0.015 0.115 0.136 0.000 0.101* 0.121* -0.015*
Total Assets 861.8 339.5 1760.55 377.88 -522.3* 898.65* -484.0*
Age 35.859 32.671 32.600 34.186 -3.188* -3.259* -1.673
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 0.184 0.214 0.180 0.155 0.031* -0.004 -0.029*
Lag Dividend Payment Dummy 0.636 0.652 0.813 0.616 0.016 0.177* -0.020
Cash Flow Volatility 0.092 0.072 0.055 0.118 -0.020 -0.037* 0.026
Liquidity 2.682 2.879 2.994 2.998 0.197 0.313** 0.31**
RND to  Assets Ratio 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*
Growth Rate of Assets 11.032 14.943 31.968 3.209 3.910* 20.935* -7.823*
Tangible Assets  0.524 1.006 0.501 0.584 0.482 -0.023 0.060
Net Profit to Assets Ratio 0.090 0.004 0.049 0.069 -0.086* -0.041* -0.021
Financial Slack 0.186 0.125 0.145 0.187 -0.061* -0.041* 0.000
Hot Year Dummy 0.325 0.265 0.406 0.236 -0.060* 0.081* -0.089*
 
A very similar picture emerges when we further analyze the difference in average 
characteristics among pure debt, pure equity and a joint debt and equity issuing firms in 
Table 7B.   
 
Finally before proceeding to our empirical model, we analyze the difference in the average 
characteristics of firms which follow the classical pecking order prediction of exact 
proportional relationship between net debt issue and financing deficit from their counterparts 
which do not follow the pecking order. Table 8 provides the results of this characteristic 
analysis between these two groups.  The table clearly demonstrates that the firms which 
violate the pecking order tend to be large, more profitable with dividend history, and large 
deficit.  In contrast, firms with low growth, high tangible assets and low assets specificity 
tend to follow the pecking order hypothesis. However, the risk attributes do not play any 
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significant role in differentiating these two groups. Finally, it is interesting to note that 
violation happens more in the “hot year” and also as a part of a joint issue decision of debt 
and equity.   
 
Table 8: Average attribute of security issuing firms: 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period is 
1997 to 2007. ∆D/DEF=1 indicate an exact relationship between debt and deficit as hypothesized by the 
pecking order model. For column 4, “*” indicates a statistical difference in mean at 1% level of significance, 
while “**” indicates a 5% level of significance. 
 
 
∆D/DEF=1 
(a) 
∆D/DEF≠1 
(b) 
Difference  
(a)-(b) 
Deficit to Assets Ratio -0.02 0.05 0.07* 
Surplus to Assets Ratio   -0.08 -0.03 0.05* 
Positive Deficit to Assets Ratio 0.06 0.09 0.02* 
Total Assets 307.71 1600.18 1292.47* 
Age 33.32 34.25 0.94 
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 0.19 0.18 -0.01 
Lag Dividend Payment Dummy 0.63 0.74 0.11* 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.09 0.07 -0.02* 
Liquidity 2.94 2.85 -0.08 
Net Profit to Assets Ratio 0.03 0.07 0.03* 
RND to  Assets Ratio 0.0012 0.0019 0.0007* 
Growth Rate of Assets 9.39 23.16 13.77( 
Tangible Assets  0.81 0.51 -0.30 
Financial Slack 0.15 0.17 0.01** 
Hot Year Dummy 0.25 0.37 0.12* 
Pure Equity Incidence 0.00 0.40 0.40* 
Pure Debt Incidence 0.53 0.01 -0.52* 
Combined Equity and Debt Issue 0.00 0.58 0.58* 
 
Although this univariate analysis provide valuable insight into the pecking order behaviour of 
the Indian firms, yet one needs to undertake a multivariate analysis to check robustness of 
these findings. Therefore, for a more formal analysis of pecking order hypothesis at the 
aggregate level, a series of logistic models are estimated. The logistic regression captures our 
dichotomous outcome variable which takes value one for non-conformity with the pecking 
order model (i.e., ∆D/DEF≠1). Further, in order to arrive at a robust conclusion, the model is 
tested for different specifications and the results are reported in Table 9. As we model the 
non-conformity with pecking order any significant positive coefficient would imply a higher 
likelihood of an event of non-conformity.  All the models reported in Table 9 include both 
industry and fixed year dummy to capture the unobservable firm behaviour. However, we do 
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not include them in the table due to space restriction. Models 1-6 capture various 
specifications that we have tested to check the robustness of our results. These models 
primarily differ with respect to the financial deficit variable while the rest of the control 
variables remain the same. Model 1, serving as our benchmark, clearly brings out that large, 
matured, high deficit and high growth firms tend to violate the pecking order hypothesis. The 
profitable firms are more likely to violate the pecking order hypothesis. However, debt 
capacity captured through tangible assets and past leverage play an insignificant role in 
explaining the pecking order hypothesis. Firms tend to time their equity issue during “hot 
year” indicating that the violations are more common during the hot years than otherwise. 
Most importantly, these conclusions remain invariant across all specifications. Therefore, the 
result presented so far lends support to the patched version of the pecking order suggested by 
Lemmon and Zender (2004) suggesting that firms facing moderate leverage and large deficits 
caused by high growth are among the firms which will opt out of the pecking order and issue 
equity to meet this gap.  
 Next, model 2-6 capture the threshold effect of deficit on the event of non- 
conformity with the pecking order hypothesis. Two specific approaches have been adopted to 
split the deficit into high, middle and low groups: We have used the 90th percentile value as 
the arbitrary cutoff in one, while in the other we have followed a more robust method of 
sample splitting using algorithm developed by Hansen (1999)5. The surplus group is defined 
as deficit being negative.  In addition, to understand how this threshold effect might get 
accentuated with limited debt capacity we have interacted the middle group with past 
leverage in model 6. Model 4, 5 and 6 in Table 9 fail to support the possibility of a threshold 
effect as for both the high deficit as well as the middle deficit cases the likelihood of non-
conformity with the pecking order model increases with the deficit level. Since, the 
magnitude of these two coefficients are not comparable we have estimated the marginal 
effect of each of the attributes used in the model6. The marginal effects are reported in table 
10. In all the cases the marginal effect of middle segment is higher than that of high segment 
                                                 
5 The threshold model is specified as 
itititititit ZDEFIDEFDEFIDEFD 311 )(*)(* βδβδβα +>+≤+=∆  where Z is the set of control 
variable and I isan indicator function. The mode is estimated using the algorithm developed by Hansen (1999).  
6 In the case of logistic regression, F(X) = P(Y=1|X), the Marginal Effect for Xk = P(Y=1 |X) * P(Y = 0|X) * 
bk.  
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indicating that the non-conformity with the pecking order can not be attributed to the scale of 
deficit. Moreover, the threshold effect does also not get accentuated by limited debt capacity 
as the coefficient on the interaction dummy is insignificant in all the cases.   
 
 Finally the rest of the variables such as volatility of cash flow, dividend history, liquidity 
ratio, and assets specificity have turned out to be insignificant in all the specifications. 
Further, since these variables have failed to add any additional explanatory power to our 
empirical model they have been drop from the final specifications reported in Table 9.         
  Turning to the goodness of fit of these models, most of the specifications reported in 
Table 9 tend to have a very high degree of concordance along with a high percentage of 
correct classification. All the models also satisfy the fitness criterion suggested by Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test.  
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Table 9: Pecking order test for a sample of 585 Indian firms: 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period is 
1997 to 2007. A logistic regression is estimate with dependent variable which takes value 1 if ∆D/DEF≠1 and 
zero other wise. ∆D/DEF≠1 indicates a violation of an exact relationship between debt and deficit as 
hypothesized by the pecking order model. For all columns, “*” indicates a statistical difference in mean at 1% 
level of significance, while “**” indicates a 5% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. The δ indicates the threshold value suggested by the sample split algorithm of Hansen (1999).  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -3.7613  
(6.9586) 
-3.829  
(6.9612) 
-3.7825  
(6.9814) 
-3.8976 
 (6.8523) 
-3.826 
 (6.9399) 
-3.8780 
 (6.9408) 
Deficit to Assets Ratio 0.5648 * 
(0.2251) 
     
Surplus to Assets Ratio    0.00214  
(0.1043) 
-0.0014  
(0.0967) 
-0.0129 
(0.0721) 
-0.00733  
(0.0845) 
-0.00747  
(0.0847) 
Positive Deficit to Assets Ratio  1.3659 * 
(0.2945) 
1.2304* 
(0.3161) 
   
Positive Deficit to Assets Ratio* 
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 
  0.00229 
(0.00175) 
   
High Deficit to Assets Ratio  
(DEF/TA > 90th percentile) 
   1.1825* 
 (0.3085) 
  
Middle Deficit to Assets Ratio  
(0<DEF/TA <= 90th percentile) 
   3..7177 
(0.6896) 
  
High Deficit to Assets Ratio  
(DEF/TA > δ (0.09)) 
    1.4038*  
(0.2947) 
1.4027*  
(0.2949) 
Middle Deficit to Assets Ratio  
(0<DEF/TA <= δ (0.09) 
    4.1377* 
(1.4976) 
4.3872* 
 (1.5604) 
Middle Deficit to Assets Ratio * 
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 
     -0.00303 
 (0.0054) 
Log of Total Assets 0.4825 * 
(0.0274) 
0.4888 * 
(0.0274) 
0.4786*  
(0.0283) 
0.4808* 
 (0.0275) 
0.4872 * 
(0.0274) 
0.4902* 
 (0.0279) 
Log of Age -0.184* 
 (0.0684) 
-0.1858* 
(0.0685) 
-0.1827* 
 (0.0685) 
-0.1827* 
 (0.0685) 
-0.1870 * 
(0.0685) 
-0.1874* 
 (0.0685) 
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 0.137 
 (0.0968) 
0.032 
 (0.1062) 
-0.0184 
 (0.1169) 
0.0525 
(0.1033) 
0.0336 
(0.1062) 
0.0371 
 (0.1061) 
Growth rate of Total Assets 0.00262* 
 (0.00104)
0.00189* 
 (0.000971)
0.00193* 
(0.000978)
0.00191* 
(0.00097) 
0.00191* 
 (0.000973) 
0.00190*  
(0.000971)
Financial Slack -0.4755* 
 (0.214) 
-0.4572* 
 (0.2132) 
-0.4567 * 
(0.2132) 
-0.3780** 
 (0.2142) 
-0.4384* 
 (0.2134) 
-0.4414* 
 (0.2136) 
Tangible Assets -0.0586 
 (0.0857) 
-0.076 
 (0.0881) 
-0.0718 
 (0.0873) 
-0.0675 
 (0.0869) 
-0.0754 
 (0.0879) 
-0.0742 
 (0.0874) 
Hot Year ( Year in 1997, 06 and 07) 0.368* 
 (0.1424) 
0.3529 * 
(0.1425) 
0.3532*  
(0.1427) 
0.3529* 
 (0.1426) 
0.3667 * 
(0.1428) 
0.3667* 
 (0.1428) 
       
Concordance 73.3 73.4 73.4 73.6 73.5 73.5 
% of Correct classification 83.2 83.2 83.2 83.2 83.2 83.1 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Lack Fit 
Test ( P values) 
0.64 0.53 0.72 0.41 0.80 0.86 
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Table 10: Marginal Effect of the attributes: 
A balanced panel of 585 manufacturing firms from “Capitaline Plus” data base is used. The sample period is 
1997 to 2007. A logistic regression is estimate with dependent variable which takes value 1 if ∆D/DEF≠1 and 
zero other wise. ∆D/DEF≠1 indicates a violation of an exact relationship between debt and deficit as 
hypothesized by the pecking order model. For all columns, “*” indicates a statistical difference in mean at 1% 
level of significance, while “**” indicates a 5% level of significance. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. δ indicates the threshold value suggested by the sample split algorithm of Hansen (1999). Marginal 
Effect captures the partial derivative of the predicted probability with 
respect to a given independent variable. 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Deficit to Assets Ratio 0.0758* 
 
    
Surplus to Assets Ratio    
0.001 0.0006
-0.0016 
 
-0.0006 
 
-0.0006 
 
Positive Deficit to Assets Ratio  0.174* 0.1599*    
Positive Deficit to Assets Ratio* 
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 
  
0.0003
   
High Deficit to Assets Ratio  
(DEF/TA > 90th percentile) 
   0.144* 
 
  
Middle Deficit to Assets Ratio  
(0<DEF/TA <= 90th percentile) 
   0.4521* 
 
  
High Deficit to Assets Ratio  
(DEF/TA > δ (0.09)) 
    0.1795* 
 
0.1792* 
 
Middle Deficit to Assets Ratio  
(0<DEF/TA <= δ (0.09) 
    0.5698* 
 
0.6024* 
Middle Deficit to Assets Ratio * 
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 
     -0.0004 
 
Log of Total Assets 0.0558* 0.0569* 0.0558* 0.0585* 0.0567* 0.0571*
Log of Age -0.0322* -0.033* -0.0327* -0.0222* -0.033* -0.0331*
Lag Long term debt to Assets Ratio 0.0081 -0.0061 -0.0123 0.0064 -0.006 -0.0054
Growth rate of Total Assets -0.0177* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0002* 0.0004 0.0004
Financial Slack 0.0005* -0.0415* -0.041* -0.0459* -0.0377* -0.0383*
Tangible Assets -0.0426 -0.0199 -0.0194 -0.0082 -0.0195 -0.0192
Hot Year ( Year in 1997, 06 and 07) 0.0632* 0.0628* 0.0628* 0.0019* 0.0633* 0.0633*
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5. Conclusions: 
 
Evidence presented in this paper provides support in favour of the pecking order hypothesis. The 
exploratory analysis and a set of econometric models indicate that Indian firms prefer debt to equity even 
in a deregulated regime, which is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis. Equity financing for the 
Indian firm plays a minimal role, while bulk of the financing deficit is covered through debt. These results 
are novel, because of two reasons: First the fact that the Indian corporate sector follows a hierarchical 
preference pattern as predicted by the pecking order hypothesis where equity plays a very limited role as 
source of finance, is in contrast to many studies such as Fama and French (2005), Frank and Goyal (2003), 
Leary and Roberts (2004) for a set of firms from the developed countries. Second, while our results relate 
directly to India, they are of more general interest. Most of the information-based models of financial 
structure have been developed with the aim of explaining the data relating to the advanced countries like 
the U.S with a significantly different institutional and financial environment than their developing 
counterparts. However, despite these differences in institutional framework, our findings point out that 
information-based model like pecking order hypothesis can successfully predict the capital structure 
choice for our sample, particularly for the equity issuing firms. These results are not surprising from the 
perspective of the pecking order theory as weak regulatory framework in many developing countries does 
not facilitate effective information disclosures and hence the relationships derived from information based 
models (e.g. pecking order model) are more likely to have a better empirical validity here. Therefore, 
contrary to general intuition, many of the mainstream capital structure theories do conform to the realities 
of developing countries, despite their differences in institutional characteristics.  
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